Paintball and Airsoft Battle Tactics

In August 1990, the Ocala Raiders paintball team hosted the “Operation Broken Eagle” Vietnam reenactment event at The Survival Zone field in Ocala, Florida. Andrew ‘DORSAI’ Van Der Plaats (www.NLTM.us) was in command of a detachment of the 5th Special Forces during this mission.

The U.S. forces were to cover down on a given geographic location to stop the Viet Cong movement through their sector. Van Der Plaats’ forces occupied Firebase Delaware, a rectangular defensive position that dominated the terrain. To add depth to this position, Van Der Plaats positioned several three-man observation post/listening posts (OP/LP) throughout his sector. One OP/LP in particular oversaw a bridgehead some 20 minutes march from the U.S. firebase.

Additionally, Van Der Plaats employed a reserve force using a 12-man A Team not located inside the firebase but, instead, located in a hide position known as the “Fu Qua Depression.” From this depression, the reserve force could maneuver to the rear of any advancing enemy force to conduct spoiling attacks. In this manner, they built considerable depth and flexibility into what appeared to be a run of the mill area defense.

Earlier that day, the VC made a half-hearted attempt to simultaneously attack Firebase Delaware from multiple directions. The U.S. team rather easily repelled the attack because the OP/LPs had identified the enemy in enough time to readily occupy the perimeter defenses. However, the VC determined only the most difficult approaches to the firebase were mined. The high-speed avenues of approach that afforded the defenders decent sectors of fire were left un-mined.

By 0130 Hrs in the morning, Van Der Plaats’ radio came alive with chatter. The OP/LP at the bridgehead reported a very large VC force moving across the bridge in the direction of the firebase. The reserve force at Fu Qua was put on alert.

At 0200 Hrs, the VC assault leader blew a whistle and the attack was underway. As planned, the VC used the high-speed avenues of approach to advance toward the firebase, completely side-stepping the mined areas. As planned, the U.S. troops defending the firebase had the very difficult job of identifying and engaging the enemy troops in near total darkness. The enemy advanced rapidly, hitting the firebase’s defensive perimeter.

Just as the VC seemed destined to overrun the first line of defenses, the U.S. troops turned on several large spotlights and illuminated the attacking enemy. The United States increased the volume and accuracy of their fires inflicting significant casualties. The battle raged on for another half-hour.

Several VC troops managed to gain a position with a decided advantage over the firebase’s defensive line. The enemy poured fire into the trenches from an enfilade, causing the U.S. troops to fall back to more secure positions in the firebase interior. Seeing a possible collapse of his position, Van Der Plaats ordered the deployment of his reserves.

The OP/LPs had not reported any follow-on enemy forces. This told the A Team commander in reserve that the enemy was unlikely to hit him from the rear. His team quickly advanced toward the firebase following along the enemy’s axis of attack.

When the reserve force was in position, they radioed Van Der Plaats, and Van Der Plaats instructed the defending troops to spotlight the known enemy positions and yell out the enemy locations. United States troops then shifted their fires—in this case intentionally firing at high volume into the earth in front of them, rather than shifting left or right or lifting their fires. Such fires might have been controlled, but without knowing exactly where the A Team was, the troops in the firebase would have risked hitting their own reserve force.

This high rate of fire caused the VC to respond in kind. Together, both the United States fires shifted downward coupled with the VC fires to try and maintain an upper hand in fire superiority had the effect of masking the sound of the reserve forces’ rush forward.

With the enemy’s massed positions spotlighted, the A Team hit multiple strong points along the enemy’s attack simultaneously. After each position had been neutralized, the reserve forces moved quickly to the next target of opportunity. The reserve’s counterattack from the enemy’s rear worked like a classic “hammer and anvil” tactic and had the effect of completely disrupting the enemy’s attack.

Lessons Learned? Though the area defense if often thought of as linear and static, when properly implemented, the area defense makes use of considerable depth—such as OP/LPs and the reserve force. The area defense also makes use of tactical deception such as increased rates of fire to mask movement and intentionally mining the defilades while leaving the high-speed avenues of approach un-mined, thereby, pulling the enemy into carefully prepared sectors of fire.

Furthermore, while placing the reserve force outside the defensive perimeter is a bit unorthodox, it worked. If it works, it ain’t stupid! The lesson learned here is to deploy the reserve force at an appropriate time and to maneuver it into a position where it can do the most good.

Case Study B

In January 2007, BattleSim (www.BattelSim.com) hosted “The Long Winter” airsoft event near Duvall, Washington. This event reenacts the Ardennes Campaign of World War II. John Robison of the Airsoft Recondo School acted as an observer/controller (O/C) and relayed the following report.

A U.S. Army infantry section of two rifle squads had been tasked with defending a main supply route running through a heavily wooded valley. The sheer size of the valley coupled with the known mechanized force of the enemy meant there would be no time or resources to conduct an area defense. Instead, a mobile defense would permit this small infantry section the necessary flexibility to maneuver and strike at the advancing German Army forces as they pushed through the valley.

The U.S. Army infantry had one bazooka, a 60mm mortar, and two medium machineguns as integral teams within their two squads. The senior NCO identified a noteworthy bend in the road and formed the section into an L-shaped defensive line high on the military crest of the ridgeline on the north side of the valley. He positioned his bazooka team well forward of the rest of the section so if an armored column approached, the bazooka team would be in position to maneuver to their rear. This was necessary because the bazooka was ineffective at engaging hard armor vehicles from the front or sides. The battlefield was set.

Within a couple of hours, the U.S. infantry detected movement. A German mechanized infantry platoon was moving up the valley toward the U.S. forces. A motorcycle scout team led the enemy, followed a hundred meters behind by the first German infantry squad who were walking on foot to screen for anti-armor mines and bazooka teams. Behind this squad rumbled a main battle tank, and behind the tank, followed a captured American-made halftrack with another squad of German infantry inside. Finally, pulling up the drag behind this considerable